THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND
RULES OF EVIDENCE
Arthur J. Goldberg*
While the Executive and Legislative departments find themselves
in serious discussions over the limits of their respective powers and
obligations, there are questions vital to the Rule of Law affecting the
work of the Judiciary which warrant examination. I refer specifically
to the Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates1
which the Supreme Court recently transmitted to Congress. 2 As a mem-

ber of the Supreme Court, I joined a majority of my brethren in
1963 in approving the wholesale amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and in authorizing the Chief Justice to transmit them
to Congress,3 because I regarded these amendments to be essentially

"housekeeping" rules. I concurred in approving these amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1963 on two important
assumptions: First, that the Congress retains authority to veto or amend
Rules approved by the Supreme Court, 4 and second, that the Rules extend only to matters of procedure and practice and not to matters of
substance. 5
* Former Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
This article is based on statements made before the subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee, February 8, 1973. The author wishes to state, as he did then, that
he holds the members of the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee and, of
course, the members of the Supreme Court itself, in the highest regard, respect and
esteem. Any differences with them concerning the Proposed Rules of Evidence relate to
matters of principle and should not in any way be regarded as reflecting upon the competence and dedication of those involved in the preparation and approval of the Rules.
1 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Proposed Rules of Evidence].
2 These Rules received extensive commentary in congressional Hearings. See Hearings
Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
3 See Order Transmitting Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure to Congress, 374
US. 865 (1963).
4 The consistent pattern of federal judicial procedure and the decisions and acts of the
Supreme Court all affirm the power of Congress to regulate the practice and procedure of
the federal courts and to delegate that same power to the Supreme Court. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.. 312 U.S. 1. 9 (1941); 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrcE AND PROcEuRE § 2, at 3-8 (1960).
The power of Congress to ordain and establish courts subordinate to the Supreme
Court, pursuant to Article III, section 1 of the Constitution, "carries with it the power to
prescribe and regulate the modes of proceeding in such courts." Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S.
(9 Pet.) 632, 656 (1835).
5 The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 expressly prohibits the Court from promulgating
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With respect to the- first -assungtion, the rules enabling acts"

have been construed by both Congress and the Supreme Court to mean
that Congress has the power to amend or veto rules transmitted by the
Chief Justice. In considering the Rules of Federal Procedure of 1938,
the Senate Judiciary Committee expressed the view that Congress had
the power to postpone the effective date of the Rules. 7 Similarly, the
House Judiciary Committee, in recommending that these Rules be
permitted to take effect, stated that Congress had the power to prevent
them from becoming effective." This view that Congress would retain
a veto power over rules approved by the Supreme Court was reiterated
in 1966 by Senator Joseph Tydings, when he introduced legislation to
extend rule making authority to appellate procedure and to reenact
existing enabling acts.9 In response to Tydings' bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee asserted that "Congress [could] enact a law within the
90-day period to prevent a proposed rule from taking effect." 110 Finally,
the Supreme Court itself has construed the Rules Enabling Act of
1934 to permit Congress to veto rules before they become effective:
rules that either "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right" of a litigant. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2072 (1970).
The terms "substance" and "adjective" appear to have been first applied in the legal
context by Bentham. 2 J. BENTHAM, THE WoRks OF JEREMY BENTHAM 5-6 (J. Bowring ed.
1962), noted in Kocourek, Substance and Procedure, 10 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 157, 157 (1941).
The use of the terms "substance" and "adjective" was popularized by Holland. T. HOLLAD, THE-ELEMErs OF JuRISPRu)EzcE 90 (13th ed.-1924),- noted in Kocourek, supra at 158.
However, Holland indicated that the terms adjective and procedure could be employed
interchangeably.
6 Congress has passed a series of enabling acts delegating certain authority to the judiciary. The Court was given the basic power to make rules of "pleading, practice, and procedure" in criminal actions, as well as a general power to "prescribe rules for the conduct
of their business." 18 U.S.C. §§ 8771-72 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970). The Court also
has rule making power to prescribe "the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions,
and the practice and procedure" of the federal trial and appellate courts. The scope of
actions, including in particular, admiralty and maritime
this authority extends to civil
cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). Finally, the Court has power to establish rules of practice
and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970).
7 S. R F. No. 1603, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1938).
8 H.R. REP. No. 2743, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1938). Congress, has in fact, recently
passed an Act which postponed the effectiveness of the Proposed Rules of Evidence until
express congressional approval was given. Pub. L. No. 93-12 (Mar. 30, 1973).
9 112 CONG. REc. 8588 (1966) (remarks of Senator Tydings). Ultimately, Congress
amended 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2112 (1970) to extend the Court's rule making authority to appellate practice.
10 S. RE'. No. 1406, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). In 1950 Congress declared that rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court should be reported for examination by Congress any
time before the first day of May. The limitation upon the effective date was advanced
from the close of the session to 90 days after the rules were reported. Act of May 10, 1950,
ch. 174, § 1, 64 Stat. 158. This Act, at least as to rules of evidence, has been superseded. See
note 8 supra.
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[I]n accordance with the Act, the. rules were submitted to the
Congress so that that body might examine them and veto their
going into effect if contrary to the policy of the legislature.1
In short, Congress clearly has authority to either amend or veto the
Proposed Rules of Evidence within the 90 days provided by statute or
to extend this time.
My misgivings about the Proposed Rules of Evidence concern the
second assumption; namely, that rules should extend only to matters
of practice and procedure. To my mind, some of the rules, specifically
those concerning privilege, extend beyond mere matters of procedure
and represent real changes in the substantive rights and duties of persons throughout the country. In my opinion, such changes, when examined in light of the historical evolution of the Court's rule making
power, exceed the scope of the Court's inherent and delegated authority.
Historically, courts have been generally thought to possess certain
rule making powers. 12 In England, the practice over many centuries
has been for the courts to establish rules of procedure.13 Furthermore,
those laws affecting procedure that were issued by the Anglo-Saxon and
Norman kings were in many instances codifications of existing court
custom rather than new statutory material. 14 Even when Parliament
undertook to significantly reform judicial procedure in 1833,15 it left
intact the judiciary's power to "make such alterations in the rules of
pleading and practice as [judges] should deem expedient."' 6 Nearly
11 312 US. at 14-15.
12 One writer has noted that
in every one of the procedure acts which were passed in the course of [England's]
long struggle for reform, she expressly recognized and reserved the authority in the
judges to make general rules and orders, even to the extent of changing the form
of proceedings established by Parliament.
Sunderland, The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power, 12 A.B.A.J. 548, 549 (1926) (footnote
omitted). See generally Hyde, From Common-Law Rules to Rules of Court, 22 WASH.
U.L.Q. 187 (1937).

13 One commentator has noted the progression from custom to formalized rules of
court in the development of practice and procedure. Such rules, as early as the middle
ages, were employed to bring about improvement in practice. Until the notable exception
of the original Field Code, reform in judicial procedure had taken place through rules of
court. A. VANDERnuT, THE DOCrRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY
SIGNIFICANCE 105 (1963). For a discussion of the import of the adoption of the Field Code,
see notes 35-36 infra and accompanying text.
14 Kaplan, The Validity of Legislative Regulation of Procedure, 16 TErNWt L.Q. 51,
52 (1941) (citing to M. BIGmow, HISTORY OF PRoca:uRE 191 (1880)).
15 Civil Procedure Act of 1835, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42.
16 Sunderland, supra note 12, at 549. The Judicature Act of 1873 placed almost all
control over procedure in the courts and in the bar. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative
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twenty years later Parliament further reformed and codified rules of
procedure with the passage of the Common Law Procedure Act of
1852.17 This additional act of reformation expressly provided for the
continuation of the judiciary's authority to make rules concerning any
matter relating to practice or pleadings.' 8
In this country, the judiciary has also enjoyed rule making authority,1 9 as exemplified very early by the colonial government in
Massachusetts, 20 as well as by the Supreme Court when it established
court rules as its first official administrative action. 21 A short time later,
in -response to a request by the Attorney General for guidance as to
practice before the Court, Chief Justice John Jay stated that the practice and procedure of the King's Bench and Chancery would provide
guidelines for practice before the Court. He also stated that it would
make such alterations in procedure as were necessary. 22 Thus it can be
generally concluded that, in England as well as in this country, the
promulgation of rules of practice and procedure has not been regarded
' ' 23
as an "exclusively legislative function.
This allocation of authority among the branches of a government
has been formalized in the doctrine of the separation of powers. 24
This theory was adopted by the Constitutional Convention in 1787
"not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L.
R.v. 1, 3 n.8 (1958).
17 15 & 16 Vict., c. 76 (1852).
18 Sunderland, supra note 12, at 549.
19 For a reference to early-state statutes delegating rule making authority to courts,
see Kaplan, supra note 14, at 55 n.20.
This power to make general procedural rules had been exercised by the King's courts
of Westminster for centuries when the colonial constitutions were being adopted. This
practice of judicial rule making obviously had sustained vitality in this country:
[I]f anything was received from England as a part of our institutions, it was that
the making of these general rules of practice was a judicial function.
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 601 (1926).
20 Massachusetts Act of the Governor and Council, 1686, ch. 2. This Act declared in
pertinent part:
[T]he justices of the several courts be and hereby are empowered to make necessary rules and orders for the more orderly practicing and proceeding in said courts.
21 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 399 (1790). The Court established a seal for itself; set forth an oath
and minimum time of practice before attorneys and counselors could be admitted to practice before it; and declared that all processes of the Court would be in the name of the
President. Id. at 399-400.
22 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 414 (1792).
23 Morgan, judicial Regulation of Court Procedure,2 MINN. L. RErv. 81, 93 (1918).

24.See generally Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. Cm. L. REV. 385 (1935).
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power. '25 The founders had heeded the admonition of Montesquieu
that the principle of a "free constitution" would be subverted if one
department exercised the entire power which belonged to another
department. 26 Thus, no department was completely autonomous. The
separation left each department "in some measure, dependent upon
the others, as it left to each power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial. ' 27 No finely
drawn lines were provided; practically, it was impossible to delineate
28
the proper extent of the respective powers.
However, as between Congress and the Supreme Court, at least
with respect to the Court's rule making power,29 a series of statutes
has aided in defining that power's limits. Therefore, a review of these
pivotal statutes is warranted. The Judiciary Act of 178930 contained
25 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151-52, 160 (T. Nugent transl. 1949).

Madison, an ardent admirer of Montesquieu, saw the answer to arbitrary action in a blending of powers such as occurred in England:
On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate
and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of
the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with
foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force
of legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by
him, can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and
form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One
branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to
the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power
in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction
in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not
admitted to a legislative vote.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison). The accumulation of
these powers in one department was "the very definition of tyranny." Id. at 300. See also
id. Nos. 48-51, at 308-27 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison); 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 223-24 (P. Ford ed. 1894).
27 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28 The
boundaries eventually adopted were in most instances historical. 3
R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 639 (1959). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Murray
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). Even when an act
which unequivocally appears to be "legislative or executive it might still require judicial
interpretation." Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 U. COLO. L. Rav. 529, 530 n.6
(1969).
29 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress has the power to regulate
practice in the federal courts. See generally Beers v. Haughton, 34 US. (9 Pet.) 329 (1835);
Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825); Wyman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
0 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The legislative history of this Act has been
set out in detail in J. GoEa., HiSToRY
oF
THE UNrrE STATES SUPREME COURT: ANTECEDENTS
AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 457-508 (1971). See also Warren, New Light on the History of
the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV.L. Rav. 49 (1923).
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two applicable sections: 17 and 34. The former authorized the federal
courts "to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting [of] business in the said courts."'8 Section 34, known as the
Rules of Decisions Act, declared that in trials at common law the
"laws of the several states" would be followed by the federal courts
82
except where the Constitution or federal statutes provided otherwise.
Additionally, "the forms of writs and executions, except their
style, and modes of process," were fixed as they existed in their respective states on the date of passage of a series of process acts.83 The only
exemptions permissible were those contained in the Judiciary Act of
1789, "such alterations and additions" as the courts shall find expedient, and "such regulations" as the Supreme Court may think
proper.84 Thus, the federal courts were not permitted to adopt those
changes in state procedure as they came into effect.
This lag posed minor problems, but finally became intolerable, as
states adopted comprehensive codes of procedure.2 8 The situation de81 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73. The circuit courts were given rule making authority shortly after the Supreme Court. Act of March 2,1793, ch. 22, § 7, 1 Stat. 333.
The power granted under section 17 of the prior Act was not as detailed as that given in
section 7 which states:
That it shall be lawful for the several courts of the United States, from time to
time, as occasion may require, to make rules and orders for their respective courts
directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of declarations and other
pleadings, the taking of rules, the entering and making up judgments by default,
and other matters in the vacation and otherwise in a manner not repugnant to the
laws of the United States, to regulate the practice of the said courts respectively,
as shall be fit and necessary for the advancement of justice, and especially to that
end to prevent delays in proceedings.
82 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
a3 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2 1 Stat. 93. The Temporary Process Act was passed
a few days after the Judiciary Act. Except for establishing power to grant certain writs,
it did not establish a method of dealing with process.
84 The Permanent Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. This Act carried an
important proviso containing general rule making powers which is a "partial reenactmerit" of section 17 of the Judiciary Act. Clark & Moore, New Federal Procedure, 44 YAm
L.J. 387, 391 (1935). One year later trial courts were given the authority to promulgate
rules regulating their own practice. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, 1 Stat. 335. For a
discussion of the early process acts, see J. GoEm., supra note 30, at 509-51.
The Process Act of 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278, amended the Permanent Process Act by
including the forms of mesne process within its scope. This later Act applied only to those
states admitted to the Union between 1789 and 1828. In 1842 the provisions of the 1828
Act were made applicable to those states admitted to the Union in the interim. The
Process Act of 1842, ch. 109, 5 Stat. 499. Furthermore, Federal courts sitting in states admitted between 1842 and 1872 were bound to adhere to the same provisions due to a
clause inserted in each admitting act. Warren, FederalProcess and State Legislation (pt. 1),
16 VA. L. Rzv. 421, 445 (190):
85 Between 1848 and 1868 fourteen states had approved code systems, as well as nine
territories. Warren (pt. 2), supra note 34, at 558.
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teriorated rapidly after New York enacted the Field Code in 1848.6
These broad procedural changes required that attorneys practicing in
these states be familiar with two distinct systems, since the federal
courts were restricted to the states' old common law procedure by the
Process Act.
It was this inconvenience which the Conformity Act of 187237 was
designed to remedy. 38 This Act required the federal courts in actions
at law to follow existing state "practice, pleadings, and forms and
modes of proceeding" in like causes "as near as may be."891 It was this
measure of conformity-"as near as may be"-which undermined the
effectiveness of the Act. Four years after its passage, the Court read this
phrase as not even requiring conformity "as near as may be possible,
or as near as may be practicable."40 Even though the Act directed that
the courts "shall conform," the Court found that the law was "to some
'41
extent only directory and advisory.
Legislative dissatisfaction with the Conformity Act in 1885 resulted in the introduction of a bill to repeal the Act and to substitute
a requirement that the rules of practice in equity would be applied
86 N.Y. Laws ch. 379 (1848).

87 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197. The original act contained a proviso
exempting "rules of evidence under the laws of the United States" from its jurisdiction.
This proviso, which was omitted in a later revision, has been interpreted by one commentator as indicating Congress' belief in the existence of federal evidence statutes. Leach,
State Law of Evidence in the FederalCourts, 43 HARv. L. Rxv. 554, 574 n.89 (1930).
38 Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875).
39 The passage of the Conformity Act ended the Supreme Court's rule making power
which was established by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and later statutes. See notes 30-34
supra and accompanying text. Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the United
States Supreme Court, 13 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1934). Although Congress sought to insure
general uniformity in practice and procedure in like cases in state and federal courts, the
trial courts retained limited rule making power because such conformity was to be achieved
"through the discretion of the Federal courts, exercised in the form of general rules."
Shepard v. Adams, 168 U.S. 618, 625 (1898).
40 Indianapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 301 (1876) (emphasis in original).
But see Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 301, 304 (1889). See also Clark & Moore, supra note
34, at 403.
The purpose of this latitude was to give the federal judges the power to reject local
practice which in their judgment "would unwisely encumber the administration of the law,
or tend to defeat the ends of justice." 93 U.S. at 301. Judge Learned Hand stated that the
federal courts were never "bound rigidly" by the Conformity Act:
On the contrary, we follow it only so far as in our judgment it promotes the
expedition of causes and the interests of justice, as we view them.
Mannion v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 9 F.2d 894, 895 (2d Cir.
1925). See generally Comment, Ineffectiveness of the Conformity Act, 36 YALE L.J. 853

(1927).
41

93 US. at 301.
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in all civil suitS. 4 2 This bill, however, did not pass. The next year the
American Bar Association was presented with two questions on procedure: The first was a resolution declaring that a code of federal
procedure was "both desirable and practicable." 43 The second resolution, introduced by David Dudley Field, called for approval of a bill
in Congress which would appoint a commission to develop such a
code. 44 Although both proposals were adopted, 45 positive response from
Congress was not forthcoming.4 6 In 1895, it was suggested that the
Association study the underlying problems presented by the lack of
uniformity among the federal courts, 47 but a recommendation that

Congress appoint a commission to study the matter and draft a plan
was ultimately rejected. 48 The matter did not come to the forefront

until President Taft, in a message to Congress in 1910, urged that the

49
Supreme Court be given the authority to regulate procedure at law.
42 For a discussion of this bill, see Note, A National Code of Procedure, 18 AM. L. REv.
464, 464 (1884). The author of the Note suggests that uniform rules of procedure could be
better formulated by the courts than by the legislature. Id. This measure appears to have
foreshadowed the merging of law and equity in 1934.
Rule making in equity and admiralty causes has had an independent history. The
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of equity and admiralty was firmly
established by the Permanent Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275. See note 34
supra.
Barron and Holtzoff, in their treatise, chronicle the major developments of the rules
of equity as follows. The first equity rules were promulgated in 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xvii
(1822). These were followed by amendments in 1842, reproduced in 20 L. Ed. 910 (1884).
Several minor changes later took place. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) vii (1864); 97 U.S. vii (1879):
104 U.S. ix (1882). One major revision occurred in 1912 before the merger of equity and
law under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 226 US. 649 (1912). 1 W. BARRON &
A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 4, § 3, at 11 n.22.
Hart and Wechsler, in their extensive work on federal jurisdiction, trace the history,
of rules of admiralty by noting the following significant events. After the initial admiralty
rule making power was granted, the Supreme Court did not generate any rules in this
area for over fifty years. Reliance was placed on the rules in the district courts. With the
impetus of an act affirming its rule making authority in 1842, the Court promulgated rules
for admiralty and maritime causes. 44 U.S. (3 How.) ix (1845). These rules were superseded
by later declarations in 1921. 254 U.S. 671 (1921). They were subject to frequent amending
by the Court until admiralty procedure was merged with civil procedure. 383 U.S. 1029
(1966); H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 666-67
(2d ed. 1973).
43 ABA, REPORT OF THE 1-TH ANNUAL MEETING, at 64 (1888).
44 ABA, REPORT OF THE 9rT ANNUAL MEETING, at 75 (1886).
45 ABA, REPORT OF THE I1TH ANNUAL MEETING, at 79 (1888); ABA, REPORT OF THE 9TH
ANNUAL MEETING, at 81 (1886).
46 ABA, REPORT OF THE 15TH ANNUAL MEETING, at 315 (1892).
47 ABA, REPORT OF THE 18TH ANNUAL MEETING, at 33 (1895).
48 ABA, REPORT OF THE 19"m ANNUAL MEETING, at 47 (1896). A like proposal met the
same fate two years later. ABA, REPORT OF T-E 21sT ANNUAL MEETING, at 33 (1898).
49 46 CONG. REc. 25 (1911) (remarks of President Taft). The initiative for judicial rule
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A resolution was offered shortly thereafter at the annual meeting
of the American Bar Association by Thomas W. Shelton urging, inter
alia, that the Supreme Court prepare rules of practice for the federal
courts and that a Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure be established to assist in making this recommendation law. 50 This effort
eventually resulted in the passage of the Rules Enabling Act. In its
final form it gave the Court the power "to prescribe by general rules,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure of the district courts ...

in civil actions." These rules, how-

51
ever, were not to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
Despite the broad powers delegated by Congress to the Supreme
Court by the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the competency of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of evidence was immediately questioned. Some assumed at the time of the enabling statute, that the delegation did not include authority to promulgate any rules of evidence
at all. 52 This assumption emanated from the traditional failure of the
making power was not undertaken so much for the superior ability of the Court in this
matter as for the desire to achieve local uniformity. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making
Power to the Supreme Court of the United States, 32 Micu. L. REv. 1116, 1117 (1934).
50 The history of Mr. Shelton's resolution can be gleaned from the following reports:
ABA, REPORT OF THE 34TH ANNUAL MEETING, at 50 (1911); ABA, REPORT OF THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING, at 434-35 (1912); ABA, REPORT OF THE 49m ANNUAL MEETING, at 520 (1926).
The persistent efforts of Mr. Shelton and the Committee have been chronicled elsewhere.
See Clark & Moore, supra note 34, at 388-90; Sunderland, supra note 49, at 1117-20; Wickes,
supra note 39, at 8-10.
Shelton's efforts were met by the formidable opposition of Senator Thomas J. Walsh,
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and chief adversary of rule making by the
Court. See committee reports in opposition, S. REp. No. 440, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928);
S. Doc. No. 105, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926). See also Walsh, Rule-Making Power on the
Law Side of Federal Practice, 13 A.B.A.J. 87 (1927). For a view opposing Walsh see Pound,
Senator Walsh on Rule Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 13 A.B.A.J. 84
(1927).
51 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). The effect of this Act was to nullify the Conformity Act
which had mandated federal courts to adhere to State procedure "as near as may be." It
also restored to the Court rule making authority which was initially granted under section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Clark & Moore, supra note 34, at 391.
52 Wickes, supra note 39, at 23-25. See also Williams, The Source of Authority for
Rules of Court Affecting Procedure,22 WAsH. U.L.Q. 459, 462-65 (1937). But see Callahan &
Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,45 YALE L.J. 622, 641-44
(1936); Sunderland, Characterand Extent of the Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme
Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404, 407 (1935).
Callahan and Ferguson suggest that the doubt as to whether the Enabling Act of 1934
extends to rules of evidence was predicated on two factors:
(I) the provision in the Act providing that said law rules "Shall neither abridge,
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant;" and (2) the general
but not universal tendency in the past to regard evidence as falling within Section
34 of the original Judiciary Act, commonly known as the Rules of Decision Act-
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Court, which has been vested with rule making authority since 1792,
to prescribe detailed rules of evidence. To undertake a "revolutionary
departure from the customary practice of courts . . . in the absence
of clear and express authority" appeared unwarranted.5 3
The original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules also expressed
misgivings about drafting rules of evidence. The Committee initially
regarded evidence as not within the parameters of the rule making
power, but later concluded that rules of evidence are matters of procedure 54 and therefore within the scope of the Court's delegated authority. Nevertheless, the Committee elected to deal with evidence in
5n
a limited manner.
Initial doubts regarding the power of the Supreme Court to rule
on matters of evidence were largely dispelled when Rule 43,56 promulgated by the Supreme Court, was eventually adopted. Although the
rule touches only lightly on questions of admissibility and makes no
reference whatsoever to rules of privilege, the rule indicates that the
Supreme Court assumed authority under the enabling statute to control at least some aspects of the law of evidence.5"
Nevertheless, in 1961, when the Judicial Conference of the United
a statute which has always been regarded as governing substantive and not procedural rights.
Callahan & Ferguson, supra at 641-42 (footnotes omitted). These authors dispose of these
arguments by contending that "rules of evidence should be considered within the domain
of procedural law." Id. at 642.
53 Wickes, supra note 39, at 25.
54 Address by W. Mitchell, Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules, July 21-23,
1938, in ABA, RULEs OF CrvL PROCXnURE FOR THE DSt'RIct CouRTs OF TE UNrrEn STATES

186 (1938).
55 Honorable William D. Mitchell, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, explained
that the purpose of the Committee's limited treatment of evidence was to avoid any confusion which might develop in the unified system as a result of the differences in the rules
of evidence in law and equity cases. Mitchell, Attitude of Advisory .Committee-Events
Leading to Proposal for Uniform Rules-Problems on Which Discussion Is Invited, 22

A.B.A.J. 780, 782-83 (1936). Despite the Advisory Committee's reluctance to regulate evidentiary matters, the treatment of evidence extends through twenty-one rules. Green, Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence
for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 79, 89 (1962) (hereinafter cited as PreliminaryStudy].
56 FED. R. Civ. P. 43 deals with admissibility, competency of witnesses, form and scope
of examination, record of excluded evidence, affirmation, and evidence on motions. In
essence, Rule 43 enables a federal court to admit evidence if it would be admissible under
either a federal statute, a state statute, rule or common law, or in federal equity practice.
For a discussion of the implications of Rule 43(a) see Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and

the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE L.J. 194 (1937); Pugh, Rule 43(a) and
the Communication Privileged under State Law: An Analysis of Confusion, 7 VANe. L. REv.
556 (1954); Comment, Federal Rule 43(A)-A Decadent Decade, 34 CORNEL L.Q. 238

(1948).
57

Degnan, The Law of FederalEvidence Reform, 76 HAv. L. REv. 275, 279 (1962).
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States proposed t- draft rules of- evidence, Chief Justice Warren felt
obliged- to convene a special committee to determine whether the
Supreme Court had authority to act in that area. 58 The special committee focused on the scope of the enabling act to determine whether
rules of evidence fell within its purview. Clearly, unless such rules
regulated only "practice and procedure" and did not "abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right," 59 they would be beyond the limits of
the power delegated to the Court. The Special Committee on Evidence
ultimately concluded that rules of evidence were procedural8 0 and that
their promulgation was both advisable and feasible.
To understand the Committee's classification of evidence rules as
procedural, it is essential to explore the nature of the substanceprocedure dichotomy. The Supreme Court initially defined the distinction between substance and procedure under the enabling act in
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.:61
The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of them. 2
Most rules of evidence, because they pertain to mechanics of obtaining
a fair trial, 3 meet the Sibbach test for procedure." Such rules, involv58 Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of
Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 75-76 (1962).
59 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
60 The Committee relied on the plethora of court decisions and scholarly opinion
maintaining that evidence is generally procedural. For a listing of such authority, see
PreliminaryStudy, supra note 55, at 101-04 & nn.124-25.
61 312 US. 1 (1941).
62 Id. at 14. In formulating the substance-procedure distinction, the Court looked to
the policies envisaged by Congress in enacting the Enabling Act of 1934 when it stated that
the purpose of Congress was to have "the whole field of court procedure . . . regulated in
the interest of speedy, fair and exact determination of the truth." id. at 14.
Commentators have also attempted to clarify the distinction between substance and
procedure. See, e.g., Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process, 45 HARv. L. REv. 617, 643 (1932); Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. Rzv. 467, 468 (1957).
63 Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429, 434 (1957).
64 To eliminate slavish adherence to the terms substantive and procedural in determining what rules of evidence may be prescribed under the Court's rule making power, the
following test has been suggested:
[W]hether a given rule of evidence is a device with which to promote the adequate, simple, prompt and inexpensive administration of justice in the conduct
of a trial or whether the rule, having nothing to do with procedure, is grounded
upon a declaration of a general public policy.
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ing only-the "orderly dispatch of judicial business," are squarely within
the scope of the enabling act and can be validly promulgated by the
Court.0
Nevertheless, the promulgation of any rule of evidence which affects substantive rights of a litigant are prohibited by the restrictive
clauses of the enabling act. 6 These evidentiary rules, which include
,matters related to privilege, exceed the authority vested in the Supreme Court because they are predicated on other policy considerations. 67 To decide whether a given rule is within the scope of the
Court's power, the Court
must examine the policy behind the proposed rule to determine
whether or not the purpose and effect of the rule involves the
orderly dispatch of judicial business [procedure] or is predicated
on another broader policy of the state [substance].... In most
instances the matters of evidence .
involve only matters of
practice and procedure, not of substance, or in other words, are
only matters that are involved in the orderly dispatch of judicial
business. Only privileges, burden of proof, and conclusive presumptions may involve more or should be classified as substance
and thus may be beyond the rule-making power.6 8
Despite the authority supporting the view that rules of privilege
are substantive in nature,69 it is evident that the Supreme Court, at
least in the present posture, considers rules of privilege to be within
its grant of power. Since the governing statute remits the question to
Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe Rules of
Evidence?, 26 A.BA.J. 601, 604 (1940).
65 Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure:A Study of JudicialRule Making,
55 McH. L. REV. 623, 651 (1957).
66 Degnan, supra note 57, at 283.
67 Joiner & Miller, supra note 65, at 650-51. See also note 87 infra for a discussion of
the policy considerations of rules of privilege.
68 Joiner, supra note 63, at 435 (emphasis added).
69 See note 87 infra for a discussion of the authority supporting the view that rules
of privilege are substantive. However, some cases have maintained that the question of
applicable privilege is one of procedure rather than substance. See, e.g., Belback v. Wilson
Freight Forwarding Co., 40 F.R.D. 16, 18 (W.D. Pa. 1966); Brookshire v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
14 F.R.D. 154, 156-57 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Humphries v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 177, 181
(N.D. Ohio 1953); Panella v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 196, 197 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
Each case relied on Professor Moore's conclusion that privilege is procedural, as stated in
4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrCE
26.23, at 1152 (2d ed. 1951). However, it is interesting to
note that the current edition of Moore's treatise contains no such explicit categorization of
rules of privilege.
Professor Edward W. Cleary, Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, defended the classification of the rules of privilege as procedural. He maintained
that rules of privilege concern "what evidence is admissible, [and] what evidence can be
suppressed for purposes of a judicial proceeding." Hearings, supra note 2, at 67.
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Congress for ultimate resolution, the final judgment regarding the
to
nature of privilege and the competence of the Supreme Court
70
Congress.
with
resides
area
this
in
promulgate rules of evidence
However, even if Congress determines that the Rules Enabling
Act encompasses the authority to prescribe rules of privilege, the rules
still face the constitutional implications of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.7 1 Erie and its progeny stand for the constitutional principle that
in a diversity case neither Congress nor the federal courts have the
power to create and apply substantive law in conflict with the laws of
the states in which the court presides. 72 In mandating that federal
courts adhere to state law in diversity suits, the Court sought to insure
uniformity between federal and state court systems and thereby eliminate the discriminatory practice of forum-shopping.
Although the Court in Erie enunciated a new principle of federal70 A divergence of opinion regarding the role of Congress in adopting rules promulgated by the Supreme Court was expressed in Sibbach'. In determining that FED. R. Civ. P.
35 was validly promulgated, the majority inferred congressional approval from the failure
of Congress to excise the rule from the proposed rules. 312 U.S. at 15. However, Justice
Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion, criticized this inference that was drawn from Congress' inaction. Rather, he submitted that the "drastic change" brought about by Rule 35
was of such a nature as to "require explicit legislation." Id. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Similar sentiments were recently expressed by John J. Cleary, executive director, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., who envisioned serious problems if the Proposed Rules
were adopted as a result of congressional acquiescence. Instead, he suggests that the "overhaul of existing law of federal evidence . . .would best be achieved through comprehensive legislation." Hearings, supra note 2, at 234. For an opposing view, see Degnan, The
Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in FederalCourts, 24 F.R.D. 341, 347-48 (1960).
Even when Congress has enacted rules initiated by the Court, an additional question
has been raised as to whether such promulgation signifies that the Court has effectively
passed upon their constitutionality. Addressing itself to this question, the Court has decided that transmission of rules "does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning
or consistency." Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946). Moreover, in Meek v. Centre County Banking Co., 268 U.S. 426, 434 (1925), the Court actually
struck down one of its general orders promulgated pursuant to section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
71 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The special committee commissioned by the Judicial Conference
to determine the advisability of promulgating rules of evidence concluded that potential
Erie problems should not impede the project since most of the rules were procedural in
nature. The committee recognized that some of the rules might be considered substantive
but preferred to defer final judgment to the drafters of the rules. Preliminary Study, supra
note 55, at 107-08.
An analysis of the substance-procedure dichotomy for Erie purposes is contained in
Tunks, Categorizationand Federalism:"Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939).
72 304 U.S. at 78. For a detailed discussion of the constitutional principles involved in
Erie, see Hill, The Erie Doctrine ahd the Constitution (pts. 1 & 2), 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427,
541 (1958).
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ism for the courts to follow, 73 it proposed no additional guidelines to
elucidate the substance-procedure distinction. Seven years later, the
Supreme Court sharpened the distinction between substance and procedure in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 74 by formulating an "outcomedeterminative" test. The Court was confronted with the narrow issue
of whether a federal court in equity could take cognizance of a suit
based on diversity of citizenship when recovery would be barred in a
state court by the statute of limitations. In requiring strict adherence
to state law, the Supreme Court looked to the intent of Erie rather than
any to talismanic distinctions between substance and procedure. To
implement what it envisioned as the underlying policy of Erie, namely,
uniformity of outcome in both federal and state courts, the Court put
aside all abstractions regarding substance and procedure. 75 Rather, the
Court devised a sole criterion for determining whether the statutory
limitation was a matter of substance-i.e., whether it significantly
7
affected the outcome of litigation.
The York test was substantially modified by Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Electric Cooperative,Inc.,77 in which the Court emphasized that outcome
was not the sole determinant when "affirmative countervailing considerations" favored the application of a federal rule.7 8 In this instance,
the Court retreated from its position of strict adherence to local rule
when its application would undermine an essential characteristic of
the federal system-the allocation of functions between judge and
73 Justice Harlan later referred to Erie as

one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that pro.
foundly touch the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal systems.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 US. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
74 326 U S. 99 (1945).
75 Id. at 109.
76 Id. The ramifications of strict adherence to York's outcome-determinative test are
manifested by the following cases in which rules of procedure yielded to state law: Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 US. 541, 557 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,
337 US. 535, 538 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 US. 530, 534

(1949).
Application of the outcome-determinative test in these cases generated speculation that
the federal rules had no future vitality in diversity actions. Judge Charles E. Clark referred
to the "drastic logic" of these three cases in bringing the situation to a point "where hardly
a one of the heralded Federal Rules can be considered safe from attack." Clark, Book Review, 36 CORNEL. L.Q. 181, 183 & n.8 (1950). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 55, at 226 (2d ed. 1970).

77 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
78 Id. at 537.
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jury.7 9 Rather, the Court advocated that the appropriate law be determined by carefully balancing the state and federal interests involved.
0
Finally, in 1965, the Supreme Court, in Hanna v. Plumer, rejected previous "litmus paper" criteria for distinguishing substance
and procedure and sought to re-effectuate the underlying policies of
Erie.8 1 Noting that "[t]he Erie rule has never been invoked to void a
Federal Rule,"82 the Court held that the adequacy of service of process
should be measured by FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) rather than a contrary
state law. Because the federal rule bore little relevance to the plaintiff's choice of a forum 8 and clearly regulated procedure, its application would be totally consistent with the purposes of the Erie doctrine.
It is within the framework of these decisions emanating from
Erie that the Proposed Rules of Evidence pertaining to privilege must
be scrutinized. The Proposed Rules not only limit the number, but
also narrow the scope of privileges currently enjoyed in many states.84
The Rules define nine separate privileges: Privilege for information
required by statute, lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, husbandwife, clergyman, suffrage, trade secrets, state secrets, and informaer
privilege. Furthermore, the Rules explicitly restrict the privileges
available in federal courts to those established by the Rules themselves,
79 Id. In sacrificing uniformity of rule, the Court reasoned that
[t]he policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations
cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule-not bound up with rights
and obligations-which disrupts the federal system of allocating functions between
judge and jury.
Id. at 537-38 (citations & footnote omitted).
80 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
81 Id. at 467-68.
82 Id. at 470. The court indicated that when a situation is covered by one of the federal rules, state law must yield to it unless
the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act
nor constitutional restrictions.
at
471 (footnote omitted). However, Justice Harlan outlined a distinct approach in
Id.
determining the applicable law. He proposed that the court should inquire whether the
rule substantially affects "primary decisions respecting human conduct." Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring). If so, state law should be applied even if a contrary federal rule existed.
83 Id. at 469.
84 The Proposed Rules limit the physician-patient privilege provided by most states
to a psychotherapist-patient relationship. The Rules also narrow the area of marital privilege to criminal cases. Finally, the Rules fail to recognize privileges for journalists and
accountants, despite the fact that some states have granted privilege status to these professions. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 501, Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra
note 1, at 234.
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required by the Constitution, or provided by an act of Congress. 5
Thus, the Proposed Rules would supplant all state-created privileges
in an action litigated in a federal court.
The rationale for not "giving state privileges the effect which
substantial authority has thought necessary and proper" was that Hanna
v. Plumer relegated the problem to one "of choice rather than necessity."86 The Advisory Committee arrived at this conclusion despite the
better reasoned and well substantiated belief that rules of privilege
are substantive within the meaning of the Erie doctrine and therefore
must yield to state law in diversity suits.87 The reason rules of privi85 Proposed Rule 501 provides:

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to:
(1)Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or writing.
Id.
86 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 501, Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note 1,
at 232-33. It is likely that the Advisory Committee, relying on the Court's application in
Hanna of a federal rule of civil procedure which contravened state law, reasoned that an
analogous situation would exist if a federal rule of evidence contravened state law. However, this analogy is untenable because it fails to consider the inherent differences between
a rule of procedure regulating service of process and a rule of evidence involving significant
substantive rights.
Professor Wright supports the view that a federal rule of privilege which denies
a state privilege would be a valid procedural rule and under Hanna applicable in any kind
of litigation. However, Wright has urged that the Supreme Court avoid promulgating such
rules in order to prevent state policies from being defeated by federal procedural rules.
Wright, ProceduralReform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. Ray. 563, 573 (1967).
87 This proposition is supported not only by extensive case law but also by leading
commentators. In Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir.
1962), the court held that Erie required the application of the New York rule on patientphysician privilege. The court maintained that the privilege concerns relationships fostered
outside the litigation and "'affect[s] people's conduct at the stage of primary private activity and should therefore be classified as substantive or quasi-substantive.'" Id. at 466
(quoting from H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE Frnart.AL SYSTEM

678 (1953)). The Second Circuit reiterated this view in Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555-56 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967), when it applied the state-created attorneyclient privilege in a diversity action. See generally Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956); Hardy v.'Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1237-38 &
n.16 (N.D. Miss. 1970); R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass, 295 F. Supp. 758, 760-61 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
Numerous commentators have also articulated the same belief. See, e.g., Korn, Continuing Effect of State Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 48 F.R.D. 65, 76-77 (1969);
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Courts Today,
31 TULANE L. REv. 101, 117-24 (1956); Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma
FacingDraftsmen of FederalRules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. Rv.353, 373 (1969).
A related question is whether federal courts should apply state-created privileges in
non-diversity cases. The view that federal courts are compelled to follow state law of
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lege are substantive for both the Rules Enabling Act and the Erie
doctrine is that they are designed to protect independent substantive
interests that the state has regarded as more significant than the free
flow of information.8 8 Thus, their intrinsic objective is to protect communications that the state deems inviolate.
The substantive nature of rules of privilege can be more clearly
seen when contrasted with other rules of evidence. Most evidentiary
rules, including the admission and exclusion of evidence, examination
of witnesses, judicial notice, competency of witnesses and relevance, are
designed to facilitate the fact-finding process. Rules of privilege, howprivilege in most federal question cases has been suggested by Professor Louisell. He contends that the test for determining the applicable privilege does not turn on the issue of
diversity but rather whether the case is governed by the federal Constitution, treaties, or
laws. Louisell, supra at 119-21. Judge Weinstein similarly distinguishes between cases in
which the federal courts are enforcing a national substantive policy, and cannot be bound
by state privileges and cases in which state law is being enforced. Weinstein, Recognition
in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction,56 COLuM. L. Ray. 533, 547
(1956). In essence, Weinstein proposes that "[i]n federal cases, this means that the privileges
of the jurisdiction whose substantive policy is decisive should be applied." Id. at 548.
Case law has also distinguished between diversity and non-diversity cases in determining the applicable rule of privilege. In federal question cases, compelling reasons have
been found to justify denial of a state privilege in deference to a federal rule. See, e.g.,
Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co., 57 F.R.D. 509, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United States v.
Troupe, 317 F. Supp. 416, 420-21 (W.D. Mo. 1970), afl'd, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971).
A balancing test has also been suggested as the means of determining the proper rule.
In Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1098-1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 US.
974 (1971), the court noted that the state policies giving rise to the privilege should be
balanced against the federal interest involved. However, the court also suggested that in
a federal question case, the "[e]nforcement of those [federal] policies demands that the
federal courts apply their own rules of privilege where substantial state interests are not
infringed." 430 F.2d at 1098; accord, Fears v. Burris Mfg. Co., 436 F.2d 1357, 1362 (5th Cir.
1971). Professor Degnan also advocates the balancing approach but concedes that proper
resolution is practically impossible because of inherent incongruities in the result:
Suggestions that the federal interest in obtaining all of the facts relevant to a
federal issue of law must yield to the state interest . . . seem to me to ignore the
fact that it is just as incongruous for the federal interest to yield to the state as it
is for the state to yield to the federal.
Degnan, supra note 70, at 353-54 (footnote omitted).
Yet there is case law that suggests that the issue of whether a state-created privilege
should apply in a federal court is not determined on the basis of jurisdiction. Instead of
relying on either the Erie doctrine or the balancing of interest test, in United States v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., 212 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1962), a non-diversity case, the court applied a state rule of attorney-client privilege. Basing its decision on the provisions of
FEn. R. Civ. P. 34 and 43(a), the court explicitly indicated that it could apply the state
rule because "there is no 'statute or rule' authorizing the disregard of the privilege." 212
F. Supp. at 95. It should be noted that the Proposed Rules of Evidence encompass such
a privilege which if adopted, would outdate this line of reasoning.
88 For a discussion of the nature of rules of privilege, see C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EvIDENCE § 72, at 151-52 (2d ed. 1972); Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in the Federal
Courts, 49 VA. L. REv. 692, 714 (1963); Louisell, supra note 87, at 109-15.
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ever, do not help to elicit the truth. Rather, they impede the truth
seeking process in order to serve extrinsic social policies 8 9
Despite the interest that a state has in protecting certain communications, the Advisory Committee has chosen to nullify the effect
of such legislative enactments by attempting to impose its own policy
determinations in litigation arising in a federal court.9 0 In selecting the
privileges to be accorded federal stature, the Advisory Committee reexamined the merits of prevailing privileges to determine whether
their continuance was justified. 91 Underlying this approach taken by
the drafters was the belief that the availability of all relevant evidence
92
should be sacrificed only if outweighed by strong policy objectives.
89 Judge Weinstein categorizes evidentiary rules into three groups: Truth determining rules, rules dosely associated with particular substantive rights, and state evidence
rules protecting extrinsic policy. Included in the third category are privileged communications. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules
of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 553, 361-73 (1969).
For discussion of the social policies underlying the creation of rules of privilege, see
also C. WIcrr, supra note 76, § 94, at 414; 9 C. WIGH-r & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2408, at 334 (1971); Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and
Privilege, 4 ARK. L. REv. 377, 377-78 (1950); Pugh, supra note 56, at 566.

90 To buttress their conclusion that state rules of privilege should yield to federal
rules of evidence, the Advisory Committee refuted the following arguments advanced in
favor of recognizing state privileges:
[A] state privilege is an essential characteristic of a relationship or status created
by state law and thus is substantive in the Erie sense; state policy ought not to
be frustrated by the accident of diversity; the allowance or denial of a privilege
is so likely to affect the outcome of litigation as to encourage forum selection on
that basis ....

Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note I,at 233.
The Advisory Committee rebuts the first contention by maintaining that privilege
should not be classified as substance. Because the basic impact of a privilege is on the
method of fact-finding, the drafters feel any "substantive aspect appears tenuous." Id.
The second argument is rejected by the Advisory Committee for two reasons. First,
the drafters assert that because state-created privileges are not applicable in federal criminal proceedings, state policy is already significantly nullified. Also, the denial of a privilege in the sensitive area of criminal law renders a privilege "illusory as a significant aspect
of the relationship out of which it arises." Id. Second, the drafters indicate that a legitimate
federal interest in the quality of judicial administration is present, even though federal
jurisdiction is based on diversity.
Finally, the Advisory Committee has recognized that forum shopping for a court offering the most favorable procedure in adducing information is entirely "legitimate." Id. at
234.
91 Ladd, Privileges, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORDER 555, 557.
92 Id. at 574-75. Traditionally, the duty to divulge testimony has been responsible for
limited expansion of recognized privileges. 8 J. WiGMORE, EvDENcE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Dean Wigmore has cautioned that before a privilege against disclosure
should be established, four fundamental conditions must be met:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
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To illustrate the inherent defect in the Advisory Committee's approach to rules of privilege, Proposed Rule 509, dealing with so-called
"state secrets" privilege should be examined.93 The rule is nothing less
than a secrecy code of the various kinds of information that the federal
government can withhold from the public. It creates two kinds of
secrets: secrets of state which can be withheld from a federal judge
even in the privacy of his chambers, and official information9 5 which
can be examined in camera upon court request.
Rule 509 extends far beyond the rules of "procedure" envisaged
by the rules enabling acts since it represents a secrecy statute as broad
as the Freedom of Information Act 96 enacted by Congress. In many
ways, it withholds even more information than Congress intended to
protect through the Freedom of Information Act. For example, while
the federal statute protects matters that have been classified secret by
executive order,97 Rule 509(a)(1) protects any secret "relating to the
national defense or the international relations of the United States"
whether or not it has been classified.
Furthermore, the Freedom of Information Act protects state
secrets only if they are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute.9 8
Rule 509(b), however, erables the government to withhold not only
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Id. § 2285, at 527 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Although not all state privileges
satisfy Dean Wigmore's criteria, they do represent a legislative finding that the protection
of certain relationships justifies a corresponding loss of available evidence.
93 Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note 1, at 251.
94 Rule 509(a)(1) defines a secret of state as "a governmental secret relating to the
national defense or the international relations of the United States." 56 F.R.D. 251 (1973).
95 Rule 509(a)(2) defines official information as
information within the custody or control of a department or agency of the government the disclosure of which is shown to be contrary to the public interest and
which consists of: (A) intra-governmental opinions or recommendations submitted
for consideration in the performance of decisional or policymaking functions, or
(B) subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3500, investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes and not otherwise available, or (C) information within
the custody or control of a governmental department or agency whether initiated
within the department or agency or acquired by it in its exercise of its official
responsibilities and not otherwise available to the public pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

§ 552.
Id.
96 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
97 Id. § 552(b)(1).
98 Id. § 552(b)(3).
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government secrets, but also any information that carries a "reasonable
likelihood of danger" that the evidence will result in disclosure of government secrets. In other words, Rule 509 withholds information that
in itself is not even secret. In summary, Rule 509 represents as extensive a substantive law as any in the United States Code and cannot be
dismissed as procedure. While Congress has an interest in protecting
government secrets, it must legislate in that area directly. It has not
delegated and cannot abdicate that responsibility to the Judiciary.
In fact, the House of Representatives unequivocally adheres to
this point of view, as manifested by its recent passage of H.R. 5463.19
With respect to the area of privilege, the bill reaffirms the belief that
rules of substance must be established by the Congress, rather than the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, it is apparent that the House views rules
of privilege as rules of substance.
The idea that rules of privilege are substantive in nature is clearly
borne out by two significant provisions of the bill. First, the bill mandates that state rules of privilege be applied in'civil actions where the
issue is governed by state law.' 0 0 Second, the bill requires affirmative
action of Congress before a rule of privilege can be created, abolished
or modified by the Court. 10 Together, these two provisions demon99 H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on February 7, 1974.
100 H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id. at 15-16.
101 H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1974), would amend 28 U.S.C. by adding section 2076:
"The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Such amendments shall not take
effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after
the beginning of a regular session of Congress but not later than the first day of
May, and until the expiration of one hundred and eighty days after they have
been so reported; but if either House of Congress within that time shall by resolution disapprove any amendment so reported it shall not take effect. Any provision of law in force at the expiration of such time and in conflict with any such
amendment not disapproved shall be of no further force or effect after such
amendment has taken effect. Any such amendment creating, abolishing, or modifying a privilege shall have no force or effect unless it shall be approved by act of
Congress"....
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strate the House's intention to reassert its function as the ultimate ratifier of rules of privilege promulgated by the Court.
This bill seeks to accomplish the compelling objective of maintaining the delicate balance between the judicial and legislative
branches of our government. This balance would best be maintained
if Congress treats the Court's proposals as purely advisory and then
drafts its own rules. Ultimately, whether Congress or the Supreme
Court initiates the rule making process, the end result may be substantially similar. Even so, the enabling acts and the Constitution require that Congress alone must promulgate the federal rules of privilege.

